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 CASE AND COMMENT 33
generally applied to accessories.  39  The case did not prove an appropriate vehicle for 
reconsideration of the broader question of accessory liability in private law. Nevertheless, 
in its general conceptual structure, with a broad test for “common design”, which need 
not be explicit, and can be inferred, together with more than minimal participation in what 
prove to be wrongful acts, the appellate courts have signalled that the pool of potential 
defendants is wide. In reality we may not be very far away from Sales’s statement of 
principle. 
 Gerard McMeel* 
 UNPACKING THE COMPENSATORY PRINCIPLE: CAUSATION, 
MITIGATION, CERTAINTY OF LOSS AND REMOTENESS 
 The MTM Hong Kong 
 The High Court decision of  Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse SA v  MT Maritime 
Management BV (The MTM Hong Kong)  1  affi rms that the compensatory principle  2  
mandates the assessment of  actual loss resulting from the breach of a charterparty. Owing 
to the unexpected delay in obtaining a substitute charter after the original charterers had 
repudiated the charterparty,  The MTM Hong Kong raised a previously unconsidered issue: 
is the court allowed to take into account the vessel owners’ losses occurring after the date 
that the charter voyage would have been completed? Under the  Smith v  M’Guire  3  measure 
of compensation,  4  an owner is conventionally entitled only to the difference between what 
the vessel would have earned if the charter voyage had been performed, and what the 
vessel actually earned during the period of the repudiated charter voyage. In this case, the 
owners contended that their actual loss was the difference between (a) profi ts comprising 
the contractual freight as well as the profi ts they would have earned from the next two 
voyages had the contract been performed and (b) the profi t earned on the substitute charter. 
Males J held that in appropriate cases such subsequent losses—if not too remote—could 
be taken into account, thereby departing from the conventional measure. 
 Echoing the effect of the Supreme Court decision in  Bunge SA v  Nidera BV ,  5   The MTM 
Hong Kong entrenches the position that the unpredictability of commercial life is part 
and parcel of the contractual rules of compensation. The decision not only has immediate 
impact on the  Smith v  M’Guire measure of compensation for breach of a charterparty, 
it also has far-reaching implications for general contract law. It invites us to rethink the 
 39 .  [2015] UKSC 10, [21] (Lord Toulson), [38] (Lord Sumption). 
 * Professor of Commercial Law, University of Manchester; Barrister. 
 1 .  [2015] EWHC 2505 (Comm). 
 2 .  Golden Strait Corp v  Nippon Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2007] UKHL 12; [2007] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 164; [2007] 2 AC 353;  Bunge SA v  Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] Bus LR 987. 
 3 .  (1858) 3 H & N 554. 
 4 .  The measure was developed based on  Smith v  M’Guire and the ensuing line of authorities. 
 5 .  [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] Bus LR 987; noted RY Tan  [2015] LMCLQ 472 ; F Dawson [2016] LMCLQ 6. 
Yip and Goh, “The Compensatory Principle: a Golden Victory for a New Certainty” (forthcoming JBL). 
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34 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
analytical interplay between the compensatory principle and the related issues of causation, 
remoteness and mitigation. 
 The facts and decision 
 The salient facts of  The MTM Hong Kong may be simply stated. Pursuant to a charterparty 
dated 6 January 2011, the charter voyage was for the carriage of vegoil from South 
America to the contractually designated safe berth within the Gibraltar–Rotterdam range. 
However, delay caused by the vessel’s grounding while on its previous employment led to 
the charterer’s repudiation of the charterparty on 21 January 2011. Having already set sail 
for the contractually designated loading range on 19 January 2011, the vessel continued its 
voyage towards South America, arriving in Uruguay on 2 February 2011. Contrary to the 
owners’ initial prediction that a substitute charter could be readily secured, the vessel was 
not fi xed for a new carriage until 24 February 2011, when it fi nally secured a carriage of 
vegoil cargoes from San Lorenzo in Argentina to Rotterdam. This substitute charter was 
completed on 12 April 2011. 
 Some important fi ndings of fact may be added to these events. The charter voyage, 
had it been performed, would have been completed on 17 March 2011. Further, had the 
charter voyage been completed then, the vessel would have made a round-trip carrying 
chemical cargoes from Europe to the United States. These subsequent voyages were 
made impossible by the vessel’s prolonged stay in South America, which delayed her 
return to Europe. Males J held that it was implicit in these fi ndings that the chemical trade 
between Europe and the United States commanded higher freight rates than the vegoil 
cargo carriage available in South America. He also found that the owners’ decision to stay 
in South America was reasonable in the circumstances, since they did not expect the two-
week delay between 2 and 24 February 2011 in fi nding a substitute charter. Accordingly, 
while the charter voyage would have lasted from 6 January 2011 to 17 March 2011,
the substitute charter in fact lasted from 24 February 2011 to 12 April 2011. There 
was therefore a period after the supposed end-date of the charter voyage, that is, between 
18 March 2011 and 12 April 2011, which formed the part of the disputed damages between 
the parties. 
 The parties’ dispute was fi rst brought for arbitration. The owners’ case was that they 
were entitled to damages consisting of the difference between the profi t the vessel would 
have earned from the charter voyage as well as the missed voyages for chemical cargoes, 
and the profi t actually earned from the substitute charter. In their defence, the charterers 
relied on the  Smith v  M’Guire measure, which provides that the measure of damages 
for repudiation of a charterparty is the contractual profi t that would have been earned, 
less the profi t earned  during the period of charter on a substitute voyage. The charterers 
contended that the correct method of assessment was to apportion the profi t made under 
the substitute charter to refl ect the amount earned up to when the charter voyage would 
have been completed if performed, that is, 17 March 2011. By this approach, the profi t 
earned after that date on the substitute voyage would be irrelevant, as would the vessel’s 
subsequent missed employment. In the event, the arbitrators found for the owners. They 
were of the view that the compensatory principle required the owners to be compensated 
for all losses actually suffered by the owners, which would mean that the period for 
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 CASE AND COMMENT 35
assessment should not be limited to the supposed end-date of the charter voyage. The 
effect of the arbitrators’ award, although not expressly articulated by the arbitrators,  6  
was to compensate the owners for the loss suffered as a result of the vessel’s delay in 
returning to the more lucrative North Atlantic market. Dissatisfi ed with the award, the 
owners appealed to the court pursuant to the Arbitration Act 1996, s.69, arguing that the 
arbitrators had misunderstood or misapplied the  Smith v  M’Guire measure. 
 Males J dismissed the charterers’ appeal. He stated that the fundamental principle in 
assessing damages is the compensatory principle, which required the innocent party to 
be placed as far as possible in the same fi nancial position as if the contract had been 
performed.  7  The  Smith v  M’Guire measure, being a general refl ection of the compensatory 
principle, is merely a  prima facie measure of damages; it may be departed from on 
appropriate facts to give full effect to the compensatory principle. A suitable case for 
departure from this  prima facie measure would include instances where the owner suffers 
a different kind of loss, that is, “something different from loss of the profi t which would 
have been obtained from performance of the repudiated charter”.  8  An example of such a 
different kind of loss is loss of earnings from subsequent employment missed as a result of 
the disadvantageous position of the vessel by reason of redelivery to the owner at the wrong 
location, or completion of a substitute voyage which led the vessel to a different discharge 
port.  9  In Males J’s view, when an owner contracts under a charterparty, it contracts not 
only for the freight from performance of the charter, but also for “the right to have his 
vessel back again and ready for her next employment at the stipulated discharge port or 
range”.  10  Nevertheless, Males J cautioned that such losses must be suffi ciently proved, 
elaborating that, the more complex the hypothetical calculations about future employment 
of a vessel needed to prove such a loss, the less likely the claim will succeed.  11  
 Applied to the facts of the case, Males J found that the owners contracted with the 
charterers not only for the freight from the vegoil cargo, but  also to take the vessel back 
to Europe without delay to take advantage of the higher freights available from the 
North Atlantic chemical cargo voyages. Accordingly, when the charterers repudiated the 
charterparty on 21 January 2011, they not only deprived the owners of the freight from 
the charter voyage, but also delayed the repositioning of the vessel in Europe. The delay in 
turn caused the owners to miss out on earning higher freight rates from two chemical cargo 
voyages that the vessel would have been able to perform in about the same time as it took 
to perform the substitute charter: one voyage from Europe to North America, and a second 
trip from North America back to Europe. The lost freight from the missed employment 
was a different kind of loss compared with the difference in freight between the charter 
voyage and the substitute charter. This loss should therefore be duly compensated by the 
application of the compensatory principle. Given also that this loss was not too remote 
and that the owners had not failed to mitigate, Males J upheld the arbitrators’ award to 
 6 .  [2015] EWHC 2505 (Comm), [16]. 
 7 .  Ibid , [57]. 
 8 .  Ibid , [61]. 
 9 .  Ibid , [63]. 
 10 .  Ibid . 
 11 .  Ibid , [62]. 
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36 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
compensate the owners not only for the difference in profi t between the charter voyage and 
the substitute charter, but also the lost freight from the missed employment. 
 The centrality of compensatory principle 
 Consistent with recent authorities on the application of the compensatory principle in the 
shipping context,  12   The MTM Hong Kong affi rms that all relevant aspects of the case that 
have an impact on the actual quantum of losses will be taken into account, even if such 
an exercise impairs commercial certainty. For instance, in  The Elbrus ,  13  the vessel was 
better placed for employment as a result of the charterers’ repudiation of the charterparty 
such that the vessel owner was able to earn higher freight on the substitute charter than 
on the original charterparty. Teare J held that a benefi t secured by the vessel owner, which 
arose only by reason of his obtaining a substitute charter, should be taken into account 
in assessing loss. In doing so, Teare J affi rmed that it was permissible to consider the 
earnings of the vessel, actual or notional, beyond the contractual date of redelivery under 
the original charterparty. However, unlike  The Elbrus ,  The MTM Hong Kong addressed 
factors that would increase the quantum of damages for the innocent party by reason of 
the vessel’s being placed in a  worse-off position for employment, thereby  increasing the 
owner’s actual loss. Males J’s holding that such factors should be taken into account in 
assessing damages claimable by the owner is unsurprising. Indeed, it is not in every case 
that the compensatory principle operates to the sole advantage of the party in breach. After 
all, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander—the centrality of the compensatory 
principle should be to compensate the owner for its  actual loss. 
 The point of interest in  The MTM Hong Kong lies in Males J’s reasoning for allowing 
the owners’ claim for loss of notional earnings from missed voyages. As we will show in 
our analysis below, it is imperative that the outcome in  The MTM Hong Kong should be 
reached only after a careful consideration of the related issues of causation, mitigation, 
certainty and remoteness. But these issues were not so clearly distinguished or elaborated 
upon by Males J, who relied principally on the fact that the missed voyages for chemical 
cargoes were a different kind of loss from that resulting from the repudiation of the 
charterparty.  14  That the application of the compensatory principle in the context of the 
breach of a charterparty is dependent on the analysis of separate issues is evident in 
the explanation of the  Smith v  M’Guire measure of compensation in the current edition of 
 Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading .  15  The editors explain that that measure of 
compensation embodies the duty to mitigate but it is not in every case that the duty arises. 
This shows that, properly unpacked, the  Smith v  M’Guire formula is not only a broad 
 12 .  See, eg,  Flame SA v  Glory Wealth Shipping Pte Ltd (The Glory Wealth) [2014] EWHC 3153 (Comm); 
 [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 653 ; [2014] 1 QB 1080;  Bunge v  Nidera [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] Bus LR 987. 
 13 .  Dalwood Marine Co v  Nordana Line SA (The Elbrus) [2009] EWHC 3394 (Comm); [2010] 1 CLC 1. 
 14 .  See [2015] EWHC 2505 (Comm), [61]. Males J briefl y said that, in this case, “there is in general no 
reason why [a different] loss should not be recoverable in damages in addition to damages for loss of the profi t 
from performing the charter, subject of course to the principles of causation, mitigation and remoteness”. The 
only principle that he elaborated upon (though, it is submitted, insuffi ciently) is the principle of remoteness:  ibid , 
[51–55]. 
 15 .  Sir Bernard Eder et al (eds),  Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Ladings , 22nd edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2011), [19.025]. This is the edition that was current at the time of writing. 
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 CASE AND COMMENT 37
embodiment of the compensatory principle, but also incorporates at least two fundamental 
contractual limits of damages, which are remoteness  16  and mitigation. 
 Causal connection between loss and breach of charterparty and mitigation 
 As a matter of analytical sequence, the fi rst issue to consider is causation. The point that 
has not been given any attention in  The MTM Hong Kong is whether the owners’ own 
intervening act of deciding to let the vessel remain in South America to seek out substitute 
employment, rather than sailing directly back to Europe to be fi xed for freight-earning 
chemical cargo voyages, actually led to its own loss. Although authorities on the effect of 
intervening acts on causation in contractual claims are said to be few,  17  there is no reason 
why the principles applied in the corresponding tort cases should not apply.  18  For example, 
in  Compania Naviera Maropan v  Bowaters ,  19  the question was whether the claimant 
shipmaster’s reliance on the defendant charterers’ nomination order of an unsafe loading 
place broke the chain of causation. As Hodson LJ put it, the question was:  20  
 “… one of causation. If the master, by acting as he did, either caused the damage by acting 
unreasonably in the circumstances in which he was placed, or failed to mitigate the damage, the 
charterers would be relieved, accordingly, from the liability which would otherwise have fallen upon 
them.” 
 Thus, in  The MTM Hong Kong , it should be addressed, even if succinctly, whether 
the owners’ conduct after accepting the charterer’s repudiation had broken the chain of 
causation. This is closely related to mitigation, but is not the same. Given that the owners 
had not been found to be unreasonable in their action, it may be said that it is implicit in 
Males J’ reasoning that the charterers’ breach remained the effective cause of the owners’ 
loss. Generally, the party in breach is not liable for losses that the innocent party could 
have reasonably mitigated but failed to do so. Conversely, where the innocent party has 
reasonably mitigated its loss, the party in breach stands to benefi t from the adjusted state 
of affairs. It only requires a small extension of logic to say that the breaching party cannot 
take the benefi t of the adjustment without being also responsible for the consequences of 
the adjustment.  21  But it is important to appreciate how viewing the same factual dispute 
through different analytical lenses may bring about fresh insights and therefore better 
reasoning.  22  There is therefore advantage in expressly articulating the causation analysis, 
not least because it will clarify the relationship between mitigation and causation. 
Signifi cantly, it will avert the illogical conclusion that the charterers could be made liable 
 16 .  Loss of earnings from the charter voyage is undoubtedly a direct loss from breach. 
 17 .  Harvey McGregor,  McGregor on Damages , 19th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014), [8.140]. 
 18 .  Ibid , [8.146]. 
 19 .  [1955] 2 QB 68, cited and discussed in H McGregor,  McGregor on Damages , 19th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2014), [8.146]. 
 20 .  [1955] 2 QB 68, 98–99. 
 21 .  For instance, the party in breach is liable for the expenses incurred by the innocent party in undertaking a 
reasonable course of mitigating action. 
 22 .  Indeed, in other cases, causation may become the decisive element in determining the extent of liability—
an external event or the act of a third party may well have broken the chain of causation. For instance, suppose the 
owners’ subsequent charter for chemical cargoes had been disrupted by a hurricane or war hostility, the “different 
kind of loss” analysis would be woefully insuffi cient. 
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38 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
ad infi nitum for the vessel’s alleged missed employment further down the time line as 
being consequences set off by the repudiation. These important points are unfortunately 
lost or obscured from view in Male J’s preferred “different kind of loss” analysis. 
 Beyond the fi eld of shipping law, it is important that the “different kind of loss” analysis 
does not permeate general contract law and abbreviate the proper process for determining 
compensable loss. In the employment context, for instance, one issue is whether the 
compensable loss arising from breach of an implied term of mutual trust and confi dence 
amounting to constructive dismissal should be restricted to premature termination losses. 
Premature termination losses are losses causally connected to the premature termination 
of the employment contract. The damages awarded to the employee should generally 
be the same as the damages that would have been awarded if the employee had been 
actually dismissed unlawfully, similar to how the  Smith v  M’Guire measure applies for a 
repudiation of a charterparty. However, it is possible that the breach of an implied term 
of mutual trust and confi dence can give rise to fi nancial losses of a  different nature, if the 
consequences of breach include something other than merely the premature termination 
of the employment contract.  23  That these additional fi nancial losses are recoverable in 
principle is due not to the fact that they are different from those fl owing from premature 
termination, but to their  causal connection to the breach in the fi rst place.  24  
 Certainty of loss: standard of proof for notional future employment 
 The second issue that needs to be considered is the certainty of loss, particularly since 
the specifi c loss alleged in  The MTM Hong Kong is that of a lost opportunity of earnings 
from subsequent employment. In  The MTM Hong Kong , the arbitrators found on the 
facts with “some degree of certainty” that the vessel would have completed the missed 
voyages had the contract charter been performed.  25  The dispute therefore did not present 
the more diffi cult scenario where there is contention on whether the vessel would have 
been employed for these subsequent voyages. Given the simpler task at hand, Males J 
was required to do no more than merely stressing that the prospects of claim for loss of 
notional earnings would depend upon proof: “if the proof of such losses requires complex 
hypothetical calculations about the future employment of a vessel, the tribunal of fact is 
likely to conclude that they are too speculative to be recovered”.  26  But what is the requisite 
degree of certainty for the claim to succeed? 
 Essentially, this is a question of standard of proof. But it also operates as a limitation 
of loss. As Males J recognised, the requisite degree of certainty provides a logical cut-
off point for assessment of damages to avoid the impracticability of the court taking into 
account what might have happened had the charter voyage been performed up till the end 
 23 .  An example is where the breach has also affected an employee’s future employment prospects: see  Malik v 
 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1998] AC 20, 37 and 48. 
 24 .  See, eg, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal decision in  Semana Bachicha v  Poon Shiu Man [2000] 
2 HKLRD 833. In that case, a domestic helper was forced to leave her employment after just six months 
owing to an oppressive work regime. It was held that the domestic helper was entitled to damages for wrongful 
dismissal  and damages for any additional pecuniary loss caused by the employer’s breach of the implied term of 
mutual trust and confi dence. 
 25 .  [2015] EWHC 2505 (Comm), [71]. 
 26 .  Ibid , [62]. 
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 CASE AND COMMENT 39
of the vessel’s working life.  27  On this premise, it would be sensible not to set the standard 
of proof too low. Yet, the phrasing of “some degree of certainty” suggests that Males J did 
not have in mind “a balance of probabilities” standard. 
 Notably, it must be recalled that in  Bunge v  Nidera  28  Lord Toulson had proposed that 
losses that are affected by hypothetical events involving acts of third parties could be 
assessed on “a loss of chance” basis. No doubt, Lord Toulson’s proposition arose from a 
different factual matrix.  Bunge involved a case of anticipatory breach of a sale of goods 
contract. In that case, the sellers’ anticipatory repudiation of the contract arose as a result 
of their mistakenly thinking that an export embargo, declared after the contract was entered 
into and which period would have overlapped with the contractual delivery period, entitled 
them to cancel the contract in advance of the embargo’s coming into effect. The conventional 
measure, as Lord Sumption articulated in the case,  29  is the hypothetical substitute contract 
method. While agreeing in principle that the hypothetical substitute contract method 
would be appropriate in a case of an anticipatory breach of a one-off contract of sale, Lord 
Toulson did not think that the method should be applied in  Bunge where “the lost contract 
and its hypothetical substitute were subject to automatic cancellation unless the Russian 
government ban was lifted”.  30  His Lordship instead characterised the buyers’ loss in  Bunge 
as being  the loss of a chance of obtaining a benefi t in the event of the export ban being 
lifted before the shipment period.  31  
 Although Lord Toulson’s “loss of chance” analysis would be unduly complicated for 
the simple dispute in  Bunge , it can assist the court in taking into account events—being 
dependent upon third parties’ acts—that are perceived to be possible or probable at the 
time of assessment of damages and which the court considers relevant to the exercise. 
Transposed to the context of loss of future freight, where subsequent charters remain 
probable occurrences,  32  they may be accounted for in the assessment of damages on a 
“loss of chance” basis. Of course, such a method does not completely obviate all issues of 
uncertainty but it does indirectly overcome much of it. As for any residual uncertainty in 
calculations, the court, assisted by expert evidence, will have to do the best it can.  33  
 Remoteness of loss: loss of earnings from missed voyages 
 That the loss of notional earnings could be claimed on a “loss of chance” basis is different 
from saying that the loss is not too remote to be claimed. They are separate matters. 
Males J in  MTM Hong Kong did not deal with remoteness in any great detail because the 
 27 .  Ibid , [71]. 
 28 .  [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] Bus LR 987, [84–85]. Indeed, the contractual “loss of chance” claims are 
typically invoked in the context where the occurrence of possible or probable events is dependent on the acts of 
third parties: see  Allied Maples Group v  Simmons & Simmons  (a fi rm) [1995] 1 WLR 1602. Indeed, Poole has 
argued that the availability of loss of chance damages in the contractual context is not threatened by the denial 
of such claims in the medical negligence context (most notably  Gregg v  Scott [2005] UKHL 2; [2005] 2 AC 
176): see J Poole, “Loss of chance and the evaluation of hypotheticals in contractual claims”  [2007] LMCLQ 63 . 
 29 .  [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] Bus LR 987, [14]. 
 30 .  Ibid , [84]. 
 31 .  Ibid , [85]. 
 32 .  Whether a vessel can be successfully fi xed for employment is dependent upon both the decision of the 
owner and that of the prospective contracting party. 
 33 .  Ibid , [85] (Lord Toulson). 
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40 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
point was not argued before the arbitrators. However, on the assumption that the issue 
could be considered, Males J held, fi rst, that there was no implied term to the effect that 
“the charterer does not assume responsibility for loss of profi t on any employment after the 
period which would have been occupied by the repudiated fi xture”  34  such as to preclude 
the owners’ claim for loss caused by the breach and not too remote. He also held, secondly, 
that there is no reason to suppose that there is any general understanding in the shipping 
trade as to the assumption of responsibility for loss of the kind suffered by the owners’ 
missed voyages.  35  Males J’s brief treatment notwithstanding, the remoteness point is 
signifi cant and deserves fuller consideration. 
 In  The Achilleas ,  36  Lord Hoffmann held that contractual losses might be too remote (and 
hence irrecoverable) if the defendant did not assume responsibility for them, even if those 
losses were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties as not unlikely to occur as a 
result of breach.  37  Following subsequent refi nement, remoteness under English law can be 
approached by way of two stages. The fi rst is the application of the  Hadley v  Baxendale  38  
two-limb test of imputed and actual knowledge. Normally, the result reached by this fi rst 
stage would apply, unless—and this is the second stage—the background showed that that 
result is not refl ective of a type of loss for which the defendant had assumed responsibility. 
The broader implication is that Lord Hoffmann’s “assumption of responsibility” test has 
not substantively changed the law relating to remoteness, but has only “rationalised” it.  39  
 Had remoteness been fully argued and considered in  The MTM Hong Kong , the result 
might have been different. At the very least, a focused analysis on remoteness will help us 
establish the sensible limits of the precedent. This becomes apparent when one considers 
the facts in  The Achilleas . In  The Achilleas , the defendant charterer delayed redelivery 
of the vessel to its owner by nine days. This affected the owner adversely, because it had 
contracted to hire the ship to another charterer by a certain date. The defendant’s late 
redelivery delayed delivery to the new charterer, which gave the latter a right to cancel. This 
in turn forced the owner to obtain an extension of the cancellation date of the subsequent 
charter in return for a reduced rate of hire, which was a result of the market rate, 
for the hire of the vessel had fallen in an unusually rapid and drastic manner. There were 
thus two kinds of loss in contention: one was the self-contained difference in the charter 
rates for the duration of the overrun, and the other was the unquantifi able loss of the 
owner’s having to vary the rates of an existing charterparty, which the charterers knew 
nothing about. The House of Lords held that the latter loss could not be recovered as it was 
 34 .  [2015] EWHC 2505 (Comm), [73]. 
 35 .  Ibid , [75]. 
 36 .  Transfi eld Shipping Inc v  Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2008] UKHL 48;  [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
275 ; [2009] 1 AC 61. 
 37 .  See, eg, D McLauchlan, “Remoteness Re-invented?” (2009) 9 OUCLJ 109, 127. 
 38 .  (1854) 9 Ex 341. 
 39 .  Supershield Ltd v  Siemens Building Technologies FE Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 7;  [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
349 , [43]. See also  ASM Shipping Ltd of India v  TTMI Ltd of England (The Amer Energy)  [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
293 , [17–18];  Borealis AB v  Geogas Trading SA [2010] EWHC 2789 (Comm);  [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 482 , [48]; 
 Silvia Shipping Co Ltd v  Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd (The Sylvia) [2010] EWHC 542 (Comm);  [2010] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 81 , [40–48];  Ispat Indurstries Ltd v  Western Bulk Pte Ltd [2011] EWHC 93 (Comm); [2011] Arb LR 3, 
[53];  Jayesh Shah, Shaleetha Mahabeer v  HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd [2012] EWHC 1283 (QB), [232].  Cf 
Nicholas G Jones v  Environcom Ltd, Environcom England Ltd [2010] EWHC 759 (Comm);  [2010] Lloyd’s Rep 
IR 676 , [109]. 
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 CASE AND COMMENT 41
too remote or, on the reasoning of Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope of Craighead, not a type 
of loss for which the charterers had assumed responsibility. 
 If applied to  The MTM Hong Kong , it might be arguable that the owners’ loss of the 
freight earnings from the missed voyages was not something that could have been foreseen 
by the charterers. Males J’s reasoning, that the owner contracts not only for the freight 
from performance of the charter but also “the right to have his vessel back again and ready 
for her next employment at the stipulated discharge port or range”, seems to go a little too 
far. Surely, if such an argument applied, then it could have been said in  The Achilleas that 
the charterers in that case should have known that their delay would also have led to the 
owners’ delay in delivering the vessel to another charterer, with the attendant risk that the 
owner might have to renegotiate the freight payable. 
 Even if Males J’s reasoning is not inadequate for the peculiar facts of  The MTM Hong 
Kong , perhaps owing to prevalent industry practice of what an owner would do with a 
vessel redelivered to a port in Europe, the remoteness principle is signifi cant for the issue 
of indefi nite liability, to which we have alluded earlier.  40  It cannot be reasonably said that a 
charterer would have specifi cally foreseen the employment opportunities the owner would 
(and could) have secured for the vessel beyond the immediate voyage after redelivery at 
the contractually designated port on completion of the contract voyage. That takes care of 
the indefi nite liability point, but in a different manner from the causation principle or the 
point on standard of proof. 
 Conclusion 
 The MTM Hong Kong shows that the compensatory principle needs to be unpacked and 
applied with explicit reference to the principles of causation, mitigation and remoteness. 
The mere fact that an owner has suffered a different kind of loss from that contemplated 
by the  Smith v  M’Guire measure does not, by itself, lead to recoverability. To be fair, 
many of the related issues were implicitly considered in  The MTM Hong Kong , but they 
should be examined expressly and in greater detail in future cases. The recent triumph of 
the compensatory principle notwithstanding, English contract law must persevere in the 
course of principled analysis. 
 Yihan Goh* 
 Man Yip † 
 40 .  See  ante , text around fn.22. 
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